






On the Phenomenology of the Life-World
Abstract
This essay attempts to clarify the ambiguities attached to the term ‘the life-world’ and ‘a 
priori of the life-world’ in the phenomenological sense. It sketches the phenomenology of 
the life-world with respect to everyday pre-scientific life and perception, the mathematical 
and geometrical sciences of the natural world, and the eidetic and phenomenological re-




Edmund	Husserl	 (1858–1938)	 used	 the	 term	 “life-world”	 (Lebenswelt)	 for	
the	first	time	in	his	manuscripts	as	early	as	in	1917,1	but	he	did	not	present	
an	extensive	treatment	of	its	phenomenological	meaning	until	the	publication	
of	The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology	(Die 





life-world”	(das Apriori der Lebenswelt).2	
Husserl	uses	it	to	designate	“the	only	real	world,	the	one	that	is	actually	given	
through	perception”	(die einzig wirkliche, die wirklich wahrnehmungsmäßig 
gegebene, die je erfahrene und erfahrbare Welt)	and	“the	original	ground	of	
all	theoretical	and	practical	life”	(der Urboden alles theoretischen wie prak-
tischen Lebens)	 on	 the	 same	 page.3	At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 the	 “forgotten	
meaning-fundament	of	natural	science”	(das	vergessene Sinnesfundament der 
1
According	 to	 David	 Carr,	 “Husserl’s	 Prob-
lematic	Concept	of	 the	Life-World”,	 in	F.A.	
Elliston	 and	 P.	 McCormick	 (eds.),	Husserl, 
Expositions and Appraisals (Notre	 Dame:	
University	 of	 Notre	 Dame	 Press,	 1977),	 S.	
202–212,	 203	 and	 fn.	 3	 in	 reference	 to	 the	
Husserl	archives	at	Leuven.
2
Edmund	Husserl,	Die Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie, in:	 Gesammelte Werke, 
Husserliana, Band VI, hrsg.	v.	Walter	Biemel	
(Den	 Haag:	 Nijhoff,	 1954).	 Edmund	 Hus-
serl,	 The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology,	trans.	David	
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Naturwissenschaft),4	 “the	 constant	 ground	 of	 validity”5	 (der ständige Gel-
tungsboden),	“a	source	of	self-evidence”	and	“a	source	of	verification”	(eine 






mental	acquisition”	(eine universale geistige Leistung),	and	“the	construct	of	
a	universal,	ultimately	functioning	subjectivity”	(Gebilde einer universalen 
letztfungierenden Subjektivität).11	Although	“each	of	us	has	his	life-world,”	it	
is	“meant	as	the	world	for	all”	(jeder von uns hat seine Lebenswelt, gemeint 







definitions	 already	 hint	 at	 the	 problems	 inherent	 to	 the	 phenomenological	
concept	of	the	life-world.	The	task	in	this	essay	is	to	explicate	the	meaning	of	
the	phrase	“the	a priori	of	the	life-world”	(das Apriori der Lebenswelt).18	The	
first	part	of	the	phrase,	a priori,	is	no	less	problematic	than	the	second	part,	
life-world.	In	Ideas I	(Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänome-












in	 the	 natural	 attitude	 as	 the	 empirical	 natural	 sciences,	 although,	 strictly	

























At	 this	point,	 the	question	may	arise	as	 to	whether	 the	 structures	of	 trans-
cendental	subjectivity	that	Husserl	laid	out	in	the	Ideas I	capture	the	mean-








fies	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 life-world	 and	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	




“humanity’s	responsibility	for	itself”	(Verantwortung der Menschheit für sich 
selbst).21
In	 view	 of	 the	 equivocations	 resulting	 from	Husserl’s	 use	 of	 the	 terms	 ‘a 
priori’	and	‘life-world,’	we	should	examine	the	terminology	within	the	entire	


































Edmund	Husserl,	Ideen zu einer reinen Phä-
nomenologie und phänomenologischen Philo-
sophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einführung 
in die reine Phänomenologie, in:	Gesammel-
te Werke, Husserliana, Band III, 1, hrsg.	 v.	
Karl	 Schumann	 (Den	Haag:	 Nijhoff,	 1976).	
Edmund	Husserl,	Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction 
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(sinnliche Fülle).25	We	 can	 geometrically	 abstract	 these	 ideal	 objects	 from	





science	 holds	 nature	 to	 be	 ontologically	mathematizable,	 and	 the	world	 to	
be	ontologically	reducible	to	logically	or	mathematically	idealized	structures.	
“Knowing	the	world	in	a	seriously	scientific	way,	‘philosophically,’	can	have	
meaning	 and	be	possible	 only	 if	 a	method	 can	be	devised	of	constructing,	
systematically	and	in	a	sense	in	advance,	the	world	[…].”	(Die Welt ‘philo-
sophisch’, ernstlich wissenschaftlich erkennen, das kann nur Sinn und Mög-
lichkeit haben, wenn eine Methode zu erfinden ist, die Unendlichkeit ihrer 
Kausalitäten, von dem geringeren Bestand der jeweils in direkter Erfahrung 












Krisis, S.	 142;	Crisis,	 p.	 139,	 italics	 in	 the	
original.
24





D.	 Carr,	 “Husserl’s	 Problematic	 Concept	 of	
the	Life-World”,	p.	205.
27
Krisis, S.	 29/30;	Crisis,	 p.	 32,	 italics	 in	 the	
original.
28
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The	 logical	 and	mathematical	 truth	 about	 the	world	presents	 all	 objects	 in	
exact	yet	idealized	measurements	and	relationships,	while	the	real	objects	in	
the	world	never	represent	more	 than	just	approximations	 to	 these	 idealized	
objects.	Thus,	it	may	occur	that	“through	a	garb	of	ideas	[…]	we	take	for	true 
being	what	is	actually	a	method”	(Das Idealkleid macht es, daß wir für wahres	







into	 the	original	constitution	of	 ideal	objects.	Husserl	 also	 retains	both	 the	
eidetic	reduction	to	essences,	 i.e.,	of	 the	life-world	and	transcendental	sub-
jectivity,	and	the	transcendental	reduction	to	the	a priori	structures	of	trans-
cendental	 subjectivity,	 which	 are	 presupposed	 by	 all	 accomplishments	 of	
objective	constitution.	The	mathematical	and	geometrical	sciences	of	nature	
have	neither	 the	means	nor	 the	methods	 to	give	a	plausible	account	of	 the	
idealization	process	in	which	they	engage.	Thus,	they	cannot	help	but	engage	
in	abstractions	and	interpretations	of	ideal	objects	without	realizing	that	those	




life-world,	which,	 since	primitive	 times,	 always	 is	 and	 remains	 the	 forgot-
ten	meaning-fundament	of	the	pursuit	of	science.	The	world,	as	understood	















Ironically,	 the	modern	 sciences	 fall	 into	 a	 crisis	despite	or	 rather	precisely	
because	 of	 their	 purported	 success.	 Husserl	 arrives	 at	 the	 conclusion	 that	
“Galileo,	 the	 discoverer	 […]	 of	 physics	 is	 at	 once	 a	 discovering	 and	 con-
cealing	genius”	(Galileo, der Entdecker […]	der Physik ist zugleich ein ent-



















The World of Perceptual Objectivity
The	 second	world,	 i.e.,	 the	world	of	perceptual	objectivity,	 consists	of	ob-
jects	that	we	perceive	with	determinate	shapes,	sizes,	and	qualities.	In	their	










Husserl	had	already	 introduced	his	 conception	of	 the	 life-world	as	 the	 im-

























It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	Husserl’s	 critical	 argu-
ment	 against	 the	 modern	 mathematical	 sci-
ences	 of	 nature	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Nietz-
sche	 against	 Kant’s	 critical	 idealism	 in	
Beyond Good and Evil.	See	Tomislav	Zelić,	
“Nietzsche’s	 Theory	 of	 Multiperspectivism	




















germaßen	Bestimmte)	ist	teils	durchsetzt,	teils	umgeben	von	einem	dunkel bewußten Horizont 
unbestimmter Wirklichkeit.”34




















































nological	 thematization	of	 the	 life-world	by	conceptualizing	 the	 life-world	















understand	 the	world	 of	pre-scientific	 interest	 as	 a	world	 of	 culture	 in	 the	
widest	sense,	the	sciences	of	nature	and	the	scientists	themselves	belong	to	
the	life-world	as	cultural	phenomena.	Thus	in	all	the	natural	world	concep-
tions	of	 the	natural	 sciences	and	pre-scientific	 interests,	 the	“everyday	sur-
rounding	world	of	life	is	presupposed	as	existing”	(die alltägliche Lebenswelt 
als seiende vorausgesetzt),	 and	 yet	 here	 are	 also	 “the	 sciences,	 as	 cultural	
facts	in	this	world,	with	their	scientists	and	theories”	(die Wissenschaften, als 













menschliche	 Praxis	 und	 jedes	 vorwissenschaftliche	 und	wissenschaftliche	Leben	 schon	 vor-
34












ces	 of	 nature	 attain	 “the	 character	 of	 validities	 for	 the	 life-world,	 adding	
themselves	as	such	to	its	own	composition”	(den Charakter von Geltungen 
für die Lebenswelt […],	als	solche	 ihrem	eigenen	Bestande	sich	 immerfort	
zuschlagend).38	The	natural	sciences	as	such	are	constructs	of	transcendental	















the	 life-world	has	 its	 own	general	 structures.	 If	 the	method	of	 idealization	
were	indistinguishable	from	the	eidetic	reduction,	then	the	life-world	would	
be	 reducible	 to	 logical	a priori	 ideal	 objects	 resulting	 from	 the	process	 of	
scientific	idealization.	That	is,	the	life-world	would	be	a	logical	objective	a 











as	 to	whether	 the	 ideal	 limit-shape	 is	 presupposed	a priori	 or	whether	we	


















and	 restrained	by	 the	 relation	 to	 the	 type	 in	question,	 the	eidetic	 reduction	
is	 free	and	arbitrary.	According	 to	 this	differentiation,	 the	disclosure	of	 the	
life-world	as	a	stratum	of	the	a priori	structure	of	the	life-world	and	its	own	
















The A priori of the Life-World
The	 phenomenological	 conception	 of	 the	 life-world	 supersedes	 the	 above	


























entitled	 “Ambiguities	 in	 the	Concept	 of	 the	
Life-World”	 in	David	 Carr,	Phenomenology 
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We	 bring	 to	 light	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 life-world	 through	 transcendental	
subjectivity,	which	involves	the	multifaceted	intentional	meanings	that	con-



















rally.	 It	 is	common	knowledge	 that	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	(1908–61)	has	
drawn	on	Husserl’s	idea	of	the	non-Cartesian	“living	body”	(Leib)	in	contrast	







constraints	 necessarily	 keep	 the	 level	 of	 idealization	 and	 exactness	 of	 the	
phenomenologically	 motivated	 sciences	 of	 the	 life-world	 lower	 than	 that	
of	the	mathematical-logical	sciences	of	nature.	Transcendental	phenomeno-
logy	accomplishes,	first,	the	phenomenological	clarification	of	ideal	objects’	
meaning,	 which	 describes	 that	 the	 mathematical-logical	 idealizations	 of	
life-world	presuppose	manifold	accomplishments	of	the	full	intentional	life	
of	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	 Secondly,	with	 the	 genetic	 phenomenology	
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O fenomenologiji životnog svijeta
Sažetak
Ovaj članak pokušava ne samo pojasniti višeznačnosti vezane uz fenomenološke pojmove ‘život-
ni svijet’ (Lebenswelt) i ‘a priori svijeta života’ (das Apriori der Lebenswelt), nego isto ocrtati 
fenomenologiju svijeta života u odnosu prema predznanstvenom životu i svakdanje percepcije, 
matematičkim i geometrijskim prirodoslovnim znanostima te eidetičkoj i fenomenološkoj reduk-




Über die Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Essay versucht nicht nur die Vieldeutigkeiten zu entwirren, die sich um die phänome-
nologischen Begriffe ,Lebenswelt’ und ,Apriori der Lebenswelt’ ranken, sondern auch eine 
Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt in Beziehung zu vorwissenschaftlichem Alltagsleben und sinn-
licher Wahrnehmung, den mathematischen und geometrischen Naturwissenschaften sowie der 
eidetischen und phänomenologischen Reduktion der reinen Phänomenologie und phänomeno-
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Tomislav Zelić
Sur la phénoménologie de la Lebenswelt (« monde de la vie »)
Résumé
Cet article tente non seulement de clarifier la polysémie des concepts phénoménologiques « le 
monde de la vie » (Lebenswelt) et « l’apriori du monde de la vie », mais aussi de définir la 
phénoménologie du monde de la vie par rapport à la vie préscientifique, à la perception quo-
tidienne, aux sciences naturelles, mathématiques et géométriques, ainsi que par rapport à 
la réduction eidétique et phénoménologique de la phénoménologie pure et de la philosophie 
phénoménologique.
Mots-clés
Edmund	Husserl,	phénoménologie,	monde	de	la	vie
